Philsophy of Science 64 (4):95-106 (1997)

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Abstract
New research tools such as PET can produce dramatic results. But they can also produce dramatic artifacts. Why is PET to be trusted? We examine both the rationale that justifies interpreting PET as measuring brain activity and the strategies for interpreting PET results functionally. We show that functional ascriptions with PET make important assumptions and depend critically on relating PET results to those secured through other research techniques
Keywords Brain  Method  Myth  Research  Science
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DOI 10.1086/392590
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Interlevel Experiments and Multilevel Mechanisms in the Neuroscience of Memory.Carl F. Craver - 2002 - Philosophy of Science Supplemental Volume 69 (3):S83-S97.
What Do Brain Data Really Show?Valerie Gray Hardcastle & C. Matthew Stewart - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (3):572-582.
The Philosophy of Neuroscience.John Bickle, Pete Mandik & Anthony Landreth - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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