Rediscovering Empathy: Agency, Folk Psychology, and the Human Sciences

Bradford (2006)

Authors
Karsten Stueber
College of the Holy Cross
Abstract
In this timely and wide-ranging study, Karsten Stueber argues that empathy is epistemically central for our folk-psychological understanding of other agents--that it is something we cannot do without in order to gain understanding of other minds. Setting his argument in the context of contemporary philosophy of mind and the interdisciplinary debate about the nature of our mindreading abilities, Stueber counters objections raised by some in the philosophy of social science and argues that it is time to rehabilitate the empathy thesis.Empathy, regarded at the beginning of the twentieth century as the fundamental method of gaining knowledge of other minds, has suffered a century of philosophical neglect. Stueber addresses the plausible philosophical misgivings about empathy that have been responsible for its failure to gain widespread philosophical acceptance.Crucial in this context is his defense of the assumption, very much contested in contemporary philosophy of mind, that the notion of rational agency is at the core of folk psychology. Stueber then discusses the contemporary debate between simulation theorists--who defend various forms of the empathy thesis--and theory theorists. In distinguishing between basic and reenactive empathy, he provides a new interpretive framework for the investigation into our mindreading capacities. Finally, he considers epistemic objections to empathy raised by the philosophy of social science that have been insufficiently discussed in contemporary debates. Empathy theorists, Stueber writes, should be prepared to admit that, although empathy can be regarded as the central default mode for understanding other agents, there are certain limitations in its ability to make sense of other agents; and there are supplemental theoretical strategies available to overcome these limitations.
Keywords Empathy, Sympathy  Simulation Theory, Theory Theory  Action Explanation
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2010
Buy the book $6.43 used (84% off)   $35.28 new (8% off)    Amazon page
ISBN(s) 9780262515184   026219550X   9780262195508
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 47,182
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Othering, an Analysis.Lajos L. Brons - 2015 - Transcience, a Journal of Global Studies 6 (1):69-90.
Simulation, Projection and Empathy.Dan Zahavi - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2):514-522.
Empathy, Embodiment and Interpersonal Understanding: From Lipps to Schutz.Dan Zahavi - 2010 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 53 (3):285-306.

View all 55 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Empathy.Karsten Stueber - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Empathy, Rationality, and Explanation.Mark Bevir & Karsten Stueber - 2011 - Journal of the Philosophy of History 5 (2):147-162.
Rediscovering Empathy: Agency, Folk Psychology, and the Human Sciences.Sarah Borden - 2008 - International Philosophical Quarterly 48 (1):118-120.
Intentionalism, Intentional Realism, and Empathy.Karsten Stueber - 2009 - Journal of the Philosophy of History 3 (3):290-307.
Three Questions to Stueber.Shaun Gallagher - 2012 - Emotion Review 4 (1):64-65.
Comment: Three Questions for Stueber.Shaun Gallagher - 2012 - Emotion Review 4 (1):64-65.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2013-03-11

Total views
93 ( #94,618 of 2,289,511 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
8 ( #120,565 of 2,289,511 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature