Grazer Philosophische Studien 54 (1):71-87 (1998)

Authors
Dieter Sturma
Universität Bonn
Abstract
Feigl approaches philosophy of mind in the monist perspective of Logical Empiricism but he does not treat the mind-body problem in an eliminative manner. Although he modified his positions and wavered between strict reductionism and explicit non-reductionism, he never abandoned his conviction that the mind-body problem is not a pseudoproblem. Especially in his 'double-knowledge-view' he concedes private mental states that physical theory cannot account for and develops an identity theory that integrates two epistemic features - the way of immediate experience and the indirect way of knowledge-by-description. Feigl's complex treatment of the mind-body problem retains its systematical importance even in the light of later developments in philosophy of mind
Keywords Analytic Philosophy
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ISBN(s) 0165-9227
DOI 10.5840/gps19985426
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The Mind-Body Problem in the Origin of Logical Empiricism: Herbert Feigl and Psychophysical Parallelism.Michael Heidelberger - 2001 - In Paolo Parrini, Wes Salmon & Merrilee Salmon (eds.), Cogprints. Pittsburgh University Pres. pp. 233--262.

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