Abstract

To establish phenomenologically whether there is an everyday dimen­sion within the “sub-world” of science, this paper builds on Richard Grathoff’s conceptual differentiation between “lifeworld” (Lebenswelt), “everyday world” (Alltagswelt), and “daily life” (Alltägliches Leben). Such a clarification is necessary because the notion of “lifeworld” in Husserl’s or Schutz’ oeuvre is ambiguous. It means both a universal ground and an everyday world. According to Grathoff, the lifeworld is a set of general and structural dimensions of sense that relate subjectivity and world-structure and thereby make possible the constitution of specific “worlds,” including the everyday world. The latter, in contrast, exists due to its own cognitive style according to which lifeworldly dimensions become senseful. Still different from the everyday world is daily life, the routin­ized process through which certain qualities of the various cognitive styles are socially constructed. Grathoff’s distinction helps to identify an internal quality within science, which includes, on the one hand, the scientific “daily life” of routine and familiarity, such as basic methods and epistemes, and, on the other hand, needs to be understood in terms of “contextualization” (Strassheim), as a realm of the new and “extraordinary,” as in far-reaching theorizing efforts.