Martine Nida-Rümelin
Université de Fribourg
We discuss two modal claims about the phenomenal structure of color experiences: (i) violet experiences are necessarily experiences of a color that is for the subject on that occasion phenomenally composed of red and blue (the modal claim about violet) and (ii) no subject can possibly have an experience of a color that is for it then phenomenally composed of red and green (the modal claim about reddish green). The modal claim about reddish green is undermined by empirical results. We discuss whether these empirical results cast doubt on the other modal claims as well. We argue that this not the case. Our argument is based on the thesis that the best argument for the modal claim about violet is quite different from the best argument for the modal claim about reddish green. To argue for this disanalogy we propose a reconstruction of the best available justification for both claims
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00247.x
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References found in this work BETA

A Theory of the a Priori.George Bealer - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:29-55.
Materialism and the Metaphysics of Modality.David J. Chalmers - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):473-96.

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Citations of this work BETA

What Makes Unique Hues Unique?Valtteri Arstila - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5):1849-1872.
'Reddish Green' – Wittgenstein on Concepts and the Limits of the Empirical.Bernhard Ritter - 2013 - Conceptus: Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie 42 (101–102):1-19.

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