On modelling vagueness—and on not modelling incommensurability

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):95-113 (2009)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper defines and analyses the concept of a 'ranking problem'. In a ranking problem, a set of objects, each of which possesses some common property P to some degree, are ranked by P-ness. I argue that every eligible answer to a ranking problem can be expressed as a complete and transitive 'is at least as P as' relation. Vagueness is expressed as a multiplicity of eligible rankings. Incommensurability, properly understood, is the absence of a common property P. Trying to analyse incommensurability in the same framework as ranking problems causes unnecessary confusion.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,202

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

On qualitative modelling.Jarmo J. Ahonen - 1994 - AI and Society 8 (1):17-28.
Modelling vagueness: what can we ignore?Rosanna Keefe - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (3):453-470.
Fuzzy Logic and Higher-Order Vagueness.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2011 - In Petr Cintula, Chris Fermüller, Lluis Godo & Petr Hájek (eds.), Logical Models of Reasoning with Vague Information. pp. 1--19.
Ranking Functions and Rankings on Languages.Franz Huber - 2006 - Artificial Intelligence 170 (4-5):462-471.
Measuring and Modelling Truth.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (4):345-356.
Kuhn's changing concept of incommensurability.Howard Sankey - 1993 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (4):759-774.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-06-16

Downloads
65 (#239,555)

6 months
8 (#283,518)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Robert Sugden
University of East Anglia

Citations of this work

On parity and the intuition of neutrality.Mozaffar Qizilbash - 2018 - Economics and Philosophy 34 (1):87-108.
Incommensurability or Vagueness? A Comment on Rabinowicz and Sugden.Mozaffar Qizilbash - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (3pt3):333-338.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Weighing lives.John Broome - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Weighing Lives.Daniel M. Hausman - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):718-722.
Incommensurability and vagueness.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):71-94.

Add more references