In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 8. Oxford University Press. pp. 168-194 (2013)

Authors
Jussi Suikkanen
University of Birmingham
Abstract
Moral error theories claim that (i) moral utterances express moral beliefs, that (ii) moral beliefs ascribe moral properties, and that (iii) moral properties are not instantiated. Thus, according to these views, there seems to be conclusive evidence against the truth of our ordinary moral beliefs. Furthermore, many error theorists claim that, even if we accepted moral error theory, we could still in principle keep our first-order moral beliefs. This chapter argues that this last claim makes many popular versions of the moral error theory incompatible with the standard philosophical accounts of beliefs. Functionalism, normative theories of beliefs, representationalism, and interpretationalism all entail that being sensitive to thoughts about evidence is a constitutive feature of beliefs. Given that many moral error theorists deny that moral beliefs have this quality, their views are in a direct conflict with the most popular views about the nature of beliefs.
Keywords metaethics, moral error theory, belief, fictionalism, moral psychology, doxastic involuntarism, functionalism, Mackie, cognitivism and non-cognitivism
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DOI 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199678044.003.0007
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References found in this work BETA

Moral Fictionalism Versus the Rest.Daniel Nolan, Greg Restall & Caroline West - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (3):307 – 330.

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Citations of this work BETA

If Nothing Matters.Guy Kahane - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):327-353.
Moral Beliefs for the Error Theorist?François Jaquet & Hichem Naar - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (1):193-207.
The Belief Problem for Moral Error Theory.Wouter Floris Kalf - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-22.

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