A defence of Owens' exclusivity objection to beliefs having aims

Philosophical Studies 163 (2):453-457 (2013)
Abstract
In this paper we argue that Steglich-Petersen’s response to Owens’ Exclusivity Objection does not work. Our first point is that the examples Steglich-Petersen uses to demonstrate his argument do not work because they employ an undefended conception of the truth aim not shared by his target (and officially eschewed by Steglich-Petersen himself). Secondly we will make the point that deliberating over whether to form a belief about p is not part of the belief forming process. When an agent enters into this process of deliberation, he has not, contra Steglich-Petersen, already adopted the truth aim with regard to p. In closing, we further suggest that proponents of the truth aim hypothesis need to focus on aim-guidance, not mere aim attribution, for their approach to have explanatory utility so underlining the significance of Owens’ argument.
Keywords Belief  Aim  Truth
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9824-0
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References found in this work BETA
Weighing the Aim of Belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (3):395-405.
Does Belief Have an Aim?David J. Owens - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (3):283-305.

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Citations of this work BETA
Doxastic Correctness.Pascal Engel - 2013 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):199-216.
Aims and Exclusivity.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):721-731.
Sosa on the Normativity of Belief.Pascal Engel - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):617-624.
Is Epistemic Agency Possible?Pascal Engel - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):158-178.

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