Philosophical Explorations 20 (1):94-110 (2017)

Authors
Ema Sullivan-Bissett
University of Birmingham
Abstract
I give a biological account of epistemic normativity. My account explains the sense in which it is true that belief is subject to a standard of correctness, and reduces epistemic norms to there being doxastic strategies which guide how best to meet that standard. Additionally, I give an explanation of the mistakes we make in our epistemic discourse, understood as either taking epistemic properties and norms to be sui generis and irreducible, and/or as failing to recognize the reductive base of epistemic normativity. This explanation will appeal to the claim that the beliefs which constitute our epistemic discourse are false but adaptive, and are the outcome of a non-truth tracking process. The opponents of my position are philosophers who take epistemic normativity not to be reducible in this way, and to involve sui generis properties and norms governing belief. The aim of the paper is to show that epistemic normativity can be explained by appeal to the biological functions of our mechanisms of belief-production.
Keywords Truth  Function  Normativity  Epistemic norms
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Reprint years 2017
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DOI 10.1080/13869795.2017.1287296
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References found in this work BETA

The Myth of Morality.Richard Joyce - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.
The Myth of Morality.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2004 - Mind 113 (452):760-763.

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Citations of this work BETA

Biased by Our Imaginings.Ema Sullivan‐Bissett - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (5):627-647.
Why is Warrant Normative?Peter J. Graham - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):110-128.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

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