Functionalist theories of mind sometimes have viewed consciousness as emerging simply from the computational activity of extremely complex information-processing systems. Empirical evidence suggests strongly, however, that experiences without content ("pure consciousness" events, or "core mystical experience") and devoid of subjectivity (no sense of agency or ownership) do happen. The occurrence of such consciousness, lacking all informational content, counts against any theory that equates consciousness with the mere "flow of information," no matter how intricate.
Keywords Empiricism  Evidence  Functionalism  Mind  Psychiatry  Science
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Physicians and the Problem of Other Consciousnesses.Philip R. Sullivan - 1996 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (1):115-123.

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