Claudine Verheggen
York University
Olivia Sultanescu
University of Chicago
According to the sceptic Saul Kripke envisages in his celebrated book on Wittgenstein on rules and private language, there are no facts about an individual that determine what she means by any given expression. If there are no such facts, the question then is, what justifies the claim that she does use expressions meaningfully? Kripke’s answer, in a nutshell, is that she by and large uses her expressions in conformity with the linguistic standards of the community she belongs to. While Kripke’s sceptical problem has gripped philosophers for over three decades, few, if any, have been satisfied by his proposed solution, and many have struggled to come up with one of their own. The purpose of this paper is to show that a more satisfactory answer to Kripke’s challenge can be developed on the basis of Donald Davidson’s writings on triangulation, the idea of two individuals interacting simultaneously with each other and the world they share. It follows from the triangulation argument that the facts that can be regarded as determining meaning are irreducible. Yet, contra Kripke, they are not mysterious, for the argument does spell out what is needed for an individual’s expressions to be meaningful.
Keywords meaning  normativity  semantic scepticism  donald davidson  saul kripke
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DOI 10.15173/jhap.v7i2.3487
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References found in this work BETA

Wittgenstein on rules and private language.Saul A. Kripke - 1982 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 173 (4):496-499.
Rational Animals.Donald Davidson - 1982 - Dialectica 36 (4):317-28.

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Citations of this work BETA

Meaning, Rationality, and Guidance.Olivia Sultanescu - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.

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