Authors
Mark Alfano
Macquarie University
Emily Sullivan
Eindhoven University of Technology
Abstract
Social epistemologists should be well-equipped to explain and evaluate the growing vulnerabilities associated with filter bubbles, echo chambers, and group polarization in social media. However, almost all social epistemology has been built for social contexts that involve merely a speaker-hearer dyad. Filter bubbles, echo chambers, and group polarization all presuppose much larger and more complex network structures. In this paper, we lay the groundwork for a properly social epistemology that gives the role and structure of networks their due. In particular, we formally define epistemic constructs that quantify the structural epistemic position of each node within an interconnected network. We argue for the epistemic value of a structure that we call the (m,k)-observer. We then present empirical evidence that (m,k)-observers are rare in social media discussions of controversial topics, which suggests that people suffer from serious problems of epistemic vulnerability. We conclude by arguing that social epistemologists and computer scientists should work together to develop minimal interventions that improve the structure of epistemic networks.
Keywords social epistemology  formal epistemology  experimental philosophy  network  filter bubble
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DOI 10.1080/09672559.2020.1782562
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Problems for Dogmatism.Roger White - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):525-557.
Fake News and Partisan Epistemology.Regina Rini - 2017 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 27 (S2):43-64.

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