Topoi 13 (2):117-126 (1994)
Truth-maker analyses construe truth as existence of proof, a well-known example being that offered by Wittgenstein in theTractatus. The paper subsumes the intuitionistic view of truth as existence of proof under the general truth-maker scheme. Two generic constraints on truth-maker analysis are noted and positioned with respect to the writings of Michael Dummett and theTractatus. Examination of the writings of Brouwer, Heyting and Weyl indicates the specific notions of truth-maker and existence that are at issue in the intuitionistic truth-maker analysis, namely that of proof in the sense of proof-object (Brouwer, Heyting) and existence in the nonpropositional sense of a judgement abstract (Weyl). Furthermore, possible anticipations in the writings of Schlick and Pfänder are noted.
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Citations of this work BETA
Proofs as Acts and Proofs as Objects: Some Questions for Dag Prawitz.Goran Sundholm - 1998 - Theoria 64 (2-3):187-216.
Assertion and Grounding: A Theory of Assertion for Constructive Type Theory.Maria van der Schaar - 2011 - Synthese 183 (2):187-210.
Assertion and Grounding: A Theory of Assertion for Constructive Type Theory.Maria Schaar - 2011 - Synthese 183 (2):187-210.
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