AL-Mukhatabat (10):102-112 (2014)

Mika Suojanen
University of Turku (PhD)
Experience has been described as a mental state with properties that it represents and possesses. Nevertheless, the existence of experience as a mental entity has been questioned by eliminative materialism, which states that everything that goes on in the world is physical, and thus there are no mental states. Experience can be analysed as a dependent entity known introspectively by living subjects. However, when experience is necessary in order to be connected with the environment and informed of its facts, it must also exist. However, a consequence of Paul M. Churchland‘s theory is that empirical knowledge means something other than knowledge based on experience.
Keywords Empirical knowledge  Experience  Eliminativism  Mental state
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