Moral luck and partialist theories

Journal of Value Inquiry 30 (1-2):213-227 (1996)
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Abstract

I argue that partialist theories that require us to give special weight to the desires, needs, and interests of ourselves or our social group, are national. I depend this impartialist principle: if the only difference between two persons to some property, where having the property to dependent on luck, morality's demanding that we disfavor either person because the person has this property, to national

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Anita Superson
University of Kentucky

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References found in this work

Moral Luck.Bernard Williams - 1981 - Critica 17 (51):101-105.
Moral Luck.Thomas Nagel - 1993 - In Daniel Statman (ed.), Moral Luck. SUNY Press. pp. 141--166.
Partiality, favouritism and morality.John Cottingham - 1986 - Philosophical Quarterly 36 (144):357-373.

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