The rationality of dispositions and the rationality of actions: The interdependency thesis

Dialogue 44 (3):439-468 (2005)
I defend the Interdependency Thesis, according to which rational evaluations of dispositions and actions are made in light of each other. I invoke a model of rationality that relies on various levels of consistency existing between an agent’s reasons for adopting a moral disposition, the argument for the moral theory she endorses (relying on the Kantian notion that all persons are equal in humanity), her desires, disposition, and choice to be a moral person as reflected in the maxim she adopts. The Interdependency Thesis shows that we do not need to demonstrate the rationality of every morally required action in order to defeat scepticism fully.Je défends ici la Thèse de l’Interdépendance selon laquelle l’evaluation rationnelle des dispositions et l’évaluation rationnelle des actions se font en fonction l’une de l’autre. Je présente un modèle de rationalité dépendant de plusieurs niveaux de cohérence entre: les raisons pour lesquelles un agent moral adopte une disposition morale, les arguments que cette personne avance à l’appui de la théorie morale à laquelle elle souscrit (en se fondant sur la notion kantienne que toutes les personnes sont égales eu égard à l’humanité), ses désirs, ses dispositions et le choix qu’elle fait d’être une personne morale tel qu’il se reflète dans la maxime qu’elle adopte. La Thèse de l’Interdépendance établit qu’il n’est pas nécessaire de démontrer la rationalité de chaque action à caractère moral ajin de réfuter entièrement le scepticisme
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DOI 10.1017/S0012217300000822
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