On the analogy between cognitive representation and truth

Theoria 21 (1):39-48 (2006)
Abstract
In this paper we claim that the notion of cognitive representation (and scientific representation in particular) is irreducibly plural. By means of an analogy with the minimalist conception of truth, we show thatthis pluralism is compatible with a generally deflationary attitude towards representation. We then explore the extent and nature of representational pluralism by discussing the positive and negative analogies between the inferential conception of representation advocated by one of us and the minimalist conception of truth
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DOI theoria200621124
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Deflationary Representation, Inference, and Practice.Mauricio Suárez - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 49:36-47.

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