Modality and supervenience

Acta Analytica 15 (15):141-155 (1996)
Authors
Danilo Suster
University of Maribor
Abstract
According to the thesis of modal supervenience it is impossible that two objects be alike in their actual properties but differ in their modal properties. Some have argued that the concept of supervenience is inapplicable to the modal-actual case. Some have argued that the thesis of modal supervenience is trivially true. These arguments are refuted; a thesis of the supervenience of the modal on the actual is meaningful and nontrivial. The significance of the thesis is nevertheless limited by the problem of finding a nonmodal specification for the purported subvenient properties.
Keywords Metaphysics  Modality  Property  Supervenience
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