Perception as Guessing Versus Perception as Knowing: Replies to Clark and Peacocke

Res Philosophica 95 (4):761-784 (2018)
Susanna Siegel
Harvard University
A summary of The Rationality of Perception, and my replies to symposium papers on it by Andy Clark and Christopher Peacocke.
Keywords perceptual experience  cognitive penetration  perceptual justification  predictive perception
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ISBN(s) 2168-9105
DOI 10.11612/resphil.1759
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References found in this work BETA

Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.
How Probabilities Reflect Evidence.James Joyce - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):153–178.
The Role of Context in Object Recognition.Aude Oliva & Antonio Torralba - 2007 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11 (12):520-527.

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Cognitive Penetrability and Ethical Perception.Robert Cowan - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):665-682.
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The Cognitive Architecture of Perception.Juan Vázquez (ed.) - 2014 - Universidade de Porto.


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