Perception as Guessing Versus Perception as Knowing: Replies to Clark and Peacocke

Res Philosophica 95 (4):761-784 (2018)
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Abstract

A summary of The Rationality of Perception, and my replies to symposium papers on it by Andy Clark and Christopher Peacocke.

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Susanna Siegel
Harvard University

Citations of this work

The uneasy heirs of acquaintance.Susanna Siegel - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):348-365.

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References found in this work

The skeptic and the dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
Compassionate phenomenal conservatism.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.
Being known.Christopher Peacocke - 1999 - New York: Oxford University Press.
How Degrees of Belief Reflect Evidence.James M. Joyce - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):153-179.

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