Noûs 39 (3):359–396 (2005)

I will be arguing that a subject’s belief that p is justified if and only if he knows that p: justification is knowledge. I will start by describing two broad classes of allegedly justified beliefs that do not constitute knowledge and which, hence, cannot be what they are often taken to be if my view is correct. It is far from clear what my view is until I say a lot more about the relevant concept or concepts of justification that concern me. The following section describes several concepts of justification that epistemologists have employed, and, in particular, identifies the two concepts of justification that I claim are coextensive with the concept of knowledge. One of those is the deontological conception of justification: I will be arguing that one ought not believe that p unless one knows that p. I imagine that the major opposition to my view will be that it is simply obvious that there are justified false beliefs, a feeling that I try to dispel in the lengthy section on concepts of justification before I finally get around to giving the main arguments in favor of my view. A view as unorthodox as mine demands more than a single argument: I offer four in the third section. Everyone allows that many people have many unjustified beliefs, and everyone has some unjustified beliefs, but such beliefs appear to be far more prevalent on my view than on more orthodox views. In the last section, I argue that unjustified beliefs, although widespread, are not quite as common as they might appear to be on my view.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.0029-4624.2005.00506.x
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 71,199
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
The Structure of Empirical Knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.
Warrant and Proper Function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - Oxford University Press.

View all 44 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Dilemmic Epistemology.Nick Hughes - 2019 - Synthese 196 (10):4059-4090.
How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Probability 1.Daniel Greco - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):179-201.
The Ethics of Belief.Andrew Chignell - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Theorizing About the Epistemic.Stewart Cohen - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (7-8):839-857.

View all 81 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Should Reliabilists Be Worried About Demon Worlds?Jack C. Lyons - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):1-40.
The Chimerical Appeal of Epistemic Externalism.Joe Cruz & John Pollock - 2004 - In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter. pp. 125--42.
Scientific Realism, Perceptual Beliefs, and Justification.Richard Otte - 1990 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:393 - 404.
Fallibilism.Stephen Hetherington - 2005 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Role of Coherence in Epistemic Justification.T. Shogenji - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (1):90 – 106.
Is Justification Knowledge?Brent J. C. Madison - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Research 35:173-191.


Added to PP index

Total views
156 ( #76,066 of 2,517,999 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
8 ( #88,531 of 2,517,999 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes