Mind 119 (473):159-169 (2010)

Peter A. Sutton
Virginia Union University
When David Lewis ( 1986 ) told us that possible worlds were a ‘paradise for philosophers’, he neglected to add that they are a minefield for decision theorists. Possibilities — be they nomological, metaphysical, or epistemic possibilities — have little to do with subjective probabilities, and it is these latter that matter most to decision theory. Bernard Katz and Doris Olin ( 2007 ) have tried to solve the two-envelope problem by appealing to possible worlds and counterfactual conditionals. In this article, I explain why any such attempt is misguided, and why we, qua decision theorists, must focus on the probable rather than the possible
Keywords Two Envelopes  Decision Theory  Probability  Counterfactual  Katz  Olin  Paradox
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzp164
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References found in this work BETA

The Two-Envelope Paradox.Michael Clark & Nicholas Shackel - 2000 - Mind 109 (435):415--442.
The Non-Probabilistic Two Envelope Paradox.J. Chase - 2002 - Analysis 62 (2):157-160.
A Tale of Two Envelopes.Bernard D. Katz & Doris Olin - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):903-926.

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