Journal of Applied Philosophy 9 (2):203-219 (1992)

Suzanne Uniacke
Charles Sturt University
This article discusses the nature of euthanasia, and the way in which redevelopment of the concept of euthanasia in some influential recent philosophical writing has led to morally less discriminating killing/letting die/not saving being misdescribed as euthanasia. Peter Singer's defence of non-voluntary ‘euthanasia’of defective infants in his influential book Practical Ethics is critically evaluated. We argue that Singer's pseudo-euthanasia arguments in Practical Ethics are unsatisfactory as approaches to determining the legitimacy of killing, and that these arguments present a total utilitarian improvement policy—not a case for non-voluntary euthanasia.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-5930.1992.tb00310.x
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Modal Properties, Moral Status, and Identity.David S. Oderberg - 1997 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 26 (3):259-276.
Infanticide: A Reply to Giubilini and Minerva.Jacqueline A. Laing - 2013 - Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (5):336-340.
Freedom of Speech and the Public Platform.Jenny Teichman - 1994 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 11 (1):99-105.
Philosophy, Drama and Literature.Rick Benitez - 2010 - In Graham Oppy & Steve Gardner (eds.), A Companion to Philosophy in Australia & New Zealand. Melbourne, Australia: Monash University Press. pp. 371-372.

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