Philosophical Studies 140 (1):135 - 148 (2008)

Authors
Ásta .
San Francisco State University
Abstract
In this article I introduce a certain kind of anti-realist account of what makes a property essential to an object and defend it against likely objections. This account, which I call a ‘conferralist’ account, shares some of the attractive features of other anti-realist accounts, such as conventionalism and expressivism, but I believe, not their respective drawbacks.
Keywords Essentialism  Conferralism  Realism  Properties  Conventionalism
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-008-9230-4
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References found in this work BETA

The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Hutchinson & Co.
Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
Language, Truth and Logic.A. J. Ayer - 1936 - London: V. Gollancz.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.

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Citations of this work BETA

Modality is Not Explainable by Essence.Carlos Romero - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):121-141.
Anchoring as Grounding: On Epstein’s the Ant Trap.Jonathan Schaffer - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):749-767.
Social Ontology.Brian Epstein - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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