Intentionality and moral judgments in commonsense thought about action

The concept of intentional action occupies a central place in commonsense or folk psychological thought. Philosophers of action, psychologists and moral philosophers all have taken an interest in understanding this important concept. One issue that has been discussed by philosophers is whether the concept of intentional action is purely ‘naturalistic’, that is, whether it is entirely a descriptive concept that can be used to explain and predict behavior. (Of course, judgments using such a concept could be used to support moral or evaluative judgments about responsibility, praise and blame.) A related question is whether speakers’ views about moral and evaluative issues at least affect their judgments about intentionality, even if their explicit concept of intentional action is not itself evaluative.
Keywords morality   values   judgments   intentional action   intentionality   responsibility   commonsense thought   folk psychology
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DOI 10.1037/h0091244
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Person as Scientist, Person as Moralist.Joshua Knobe - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):315.
A Knobe Effect for Belief Ascriptions.James Beebe - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2):235-258.

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