Siding with euthyphro: Response-dependence and conferred properties

European Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):108-125 (2010)
Abstract
: I argue that a response‐dependence account of a concept can yield metaphysical results, and not merely epistemological or semantical results, which has been a prevalent view in the literature on response‐dependence. In particular, I show how one can argue for a conferralist account of a certain property by arguing that the concept of the property is response‐dependent, if certain assumptions are made
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2008.00303.x
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 28,157
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.
Principia Ethica.G. E. Moore - 1903 - Dover Publications.
From a Logical Point of View.Willard Orman Quine - 1953 - Harvard University Press.

View all 14 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

89 ( #58,584 of 2,171,970 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #173,676 of 2,171,970 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums