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Abstract
Moral error theorists hold that morality is deeply mistaken, thus raising the question of whether and how moral judgments and utterances should continue to be employed. Proposals include simply abolishing morality, adopting some revisionary fictionalist stance toward morality, and conserving moral judgments and utterances unchanged. I defend a fourth proposal, namely revisionary moral expressivism, which recommends replacing cognitivist moral judgments and utterances with non-cognitivist ones. Given that non-cognitivist attitudes are not truth apt, revisionary expressivism does not involve moral error. Moreover, revisionary expressivism has the theoretical resources to retain many of the useful features of morality, such as moral motivation, moral disagreement, and moral reasoning. Revisionary expressivism fares better than the three major alternatives in both avoiding moral error and preserving these useful features of morality. I also show how this position differs from the “revolutionary expressivism” of Sebastian Köhler and Michael Ridge.
Keywords error theory   expressivism   fictionalism   metaethics  non-cognitivism
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Reprint years 2015, 2017
DOI 10.1163/17455243-46810047
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References found in this work BETA

Principia Ethica.G. E. Moore - 1903 - Dover Publications.
Language, Truth, and Logic.Alfred Jules Ayer - 1936 - London: V. Gollancz.
Moral Realism: A Defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Sorting Out Solutions to the Now-What Problem.François Jaquet - 2020 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 17 (3).
The Belief Problem for Moral Error Theory.Wouter Floris Kalf - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-22.
Error Theory and Abolitionist Ethics.Lucia Schwarz - 2020 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 58 (3):431-455.
Utilitarianism for the Error Theorist.François Jaquet - 2021 - The Journal of Ethics 25 (1):39-55.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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