Appetitive besires and the fuss about fit

Philosophical Studies 165 (3):975-988 (2013)
Authors
Steven Swartzer
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Abstract
Some motivational cognitivists believe that there are besires—cognitive mental states (typically moral beliefs) that share the key feature of desire (typically desire’s ‘direction of fit’) in virtue of which they are capable of being directly motivational. Besires have been criticized by Humeans and cognitivists alike as philosophically extravagant, incoherent, ad hoc, and incompatible with folk psychology. I provide a response to these standard objections to besires—one motivated independently of common anti-Humean intuitions about the motivational efficacy of moral judgments. I proceed by examining a hypothesis about the nature of appetitive desires—that these paradigmatic motivational attitudes are a mode of perceptual experience—and argue that this hypothesis is committed to the existence of besires. However, despite its commitment to besires, this hypothesis is not extravagant, incoherent, ad hoc, or incompatible with folk psychology. In other words, the standard complaints about besires all fail. The upshot is that there is nothing bizarre about besires, and motivational cognitivism takes on no additional costs by positing them.
Keywords Appetitive desire  Besires  Direction of fit  Humean theory of motivation  Motivational cognitivism
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-0006-5
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References found in this work BETA

Moral Realism: A Defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Moral Reasons.Jonathan Dancy - 1993 - Blackwell.

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Citations of this work BETA

Reconceiving Direction of Fit.Avery Archer - 2015 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):171-180.
Blame and the Humean Theory of Motivation.Adam Thompson - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (3):1345-1364.
A Challenge for Humean Externalism.Steven Swartzer - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):23-44.
Agent-Basing, Consequences, and Realized Motives.Joseph Walsh - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (3):649-661.

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