Can the theory of contingent identity between sensation-states and brain-states be made empirical?

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):405-17 (1974)
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Abstract

Since its inception, roughly sixteen years ago, the theory of the contingent identity of mental-states and brain-states has been argued on many fronts. I want here to examine and to try to meet one in particular of the objections raised in connection with this theory. The objection has been stated with especial force by Peter Herbst.Let us then investigate a proposition that there is a particular mental entity which is contingently identical with a particular brain state. In order to be able to test it, we must know which mental entity is supposed to be identical with what brain state. Therefore we need at least two clear and independent identifying references to serve as the basis of our proposition of identity. They must each be sufficient to individuate an entity, or else we cannot say what is identical with what, and they must be independent of each other, or else the identity proposition expressed in terms of them becomes tautologous.

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Citations of this work

Philosophy of science in canada.Robert E. Butts - 1974 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 5 (2):341-358.
Philosophy of science in Canada.Robert E. Butts - 1974 - Zeitschrift Für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 5 (2):341-358.

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References found in this work

Is consciousness a brain process.Ullin T. Place - 1956 - British Journal of Psychology 47 (1):44-50.
The 'mental' and the 'physical'.Herbert Feigl - 1958 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 2:370-497.

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