Can the theory of contingent identity between sensation-states and brain-states be made empirical?

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3 (March):405-17 (1974)
Abstract This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)
Keywords Brain  Identity  Metaphysics  Mind  Sensation
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DOI 10.1080/00455091.1974.10716893
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Philosophy of Science in Canada.Robert E. Butts - 1974 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 5 (2):341-358.

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