Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (3):270–281 (2002)

Kyle Swan
California State University, Sacramento
The paper investigates different ways to understand the claim that non-cognitivist theories of morality are incoherent. According to the claim, this is so because, on one theory of truth, non-cognitivists are not able to deny objective truth to moral judgments without taking a substantive normative position. I argue that emotivism is not self-defeating in this way. The charge of incoherence actually only amounts to a claim that emotivism is incompatible with deflationary truth, but this claim is based upon a mistake. It relies upon a problematic understanding of both emotivism and the deflationary theory of truth.
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DOI 10.1111/1468-0114.00151
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References found in this work BETA

Language, Truth and Logic.Alfred Jules Ayer - 1936 - London: V. Gollancz.
Language, Truth, and Logic.A. J. Ayer - 1936 - Philosophy 23 (85):173-176.
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Wittgenstein on Meaning. [REVIEW]Paul A. Boghossian - 1989 - Philosophical Review 98 (1):83.
Emotivism and Truth Conditions.Daniel Stoljar - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 70 (1):81 - 101.

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