Modality in Language

Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1193-1207 (2008)
This article discusses some of the ways in which natural language can express modal information – information which is, to a first approximation, about what could be or must be the case, as opposed to being about what actually is the case. It motivates, explains, and raises problems for Angelika Kratzer's influential theory of modal auxiliaries, and introduces a new approach to one important debate about the relationships between modality, evidentiality, context change, and imperative force.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00177.x
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,807
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Blackwell.
Essays in Quasi-Realism.Simon Blackburn - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
Epistemic Modals.Seth Yalcin - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):983-1026.

View all 23 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
What We Know and What to Do.Nate Charlow - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2291-2323.
Probability Operators.Seth Yalcin - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (11):916-37.
Must . . . Stay . . . Strong!Kai von Fintel & Anthony S. Gillies - 2010 - Natural Language Semantics 18 (4):351-383.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index

Total downloads
108 ( #51,156 of 2,214,511 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #40,426 of 2,214,511 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature