Journal of Value Inquiry 38 (3):375-381 (2004)

Kyle Swan
California State University, Sacramento
Linda Zagzebski’s recent account of the role of emotion in the structure of moral judgments aims to reconcile the role of affect in these judgments with moral cognitivism. The account is implausible because it is based on a problematic analysis of what it is to express a moral attitude and because it makes making a moral judgment unduly difficult. I suggest a way to reconcile Zagzebski’s intuitions about moral judgments that does not encounter these two problems.
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DOI 10.1007/s10790-005-1636-z
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