Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (2):121-146 (2016)

Authors
Eric Swanson
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
Abstract
This paper develops a compositional, type-driven constraint semantic theory for a fragment of the language of subjective uncertainty. In the particular application explored here, the interpretation function of constraint semantics yields not propositions but constraints on credal states as the semantic values of declarative sentences. Constraints are richer than propositions in that constraints can straightforwardly represent assessments of the probability that the world is one way rather than another. The richness of constraints helps us model communicative acts in essentially the same way that we model agents’ credences. Moreover, supplementing familiar truth-conditional theories of epistemic modals with constraint semantics helps capture contrasts between strong necessity and possibility modals, on the one hand, and weak necessity modals, on the other
Keywords Non-truth-conditional theories of meaning  Compositionality  Credence  Assertion  Epistemic modals  Constraint semantics
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DOI 10.1007/s10992-015-9367-5
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Counterfactuals.David Kellogg Lewis - 1973 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Blackwell.
Laws and Symmetry.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1989 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Bounded Modality.Matthew Mandelkern - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (1):1-61.
How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Probability 1.Daniel Greco - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):179-201.
Prospects for an Expressivist Theory of Meaning.Nate Charlow - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15:1-43.
Full Belief and Loose Speech.Sarah Moss - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (3):255-291.

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