Future Contingents, Indeterminacy and Context

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2):408-422 (2015)

Paula Sweeney
University of Aberdeen
In Facing the Future, Belnap et al. reject bivalence and propose double time reference semantics to give a pragmatic response to the following assertion problem: how can we make sense of assertions about future events made at a time when the outcomes of those events are not yet determined? John MacFarlane employs the same semantics, now bolstered with a relative-truth predicate, to accommodate the following apparently conflicting intuitions regarding the truth-value of an uttered future contingent: at the moment of utterance, if asked to evaluate the truth-value of the asserted future contingent one has the intuition that the assertion is neither true nor false, yet later, at the moment of the predicted event, one has the intuition that the assertion was, already, either true or false. Both MacFarlane and Belnap assume that assertions of future contingents have complete propositional content – the traditional propositional contents that, according to him ‘are the contents of assertions and beliefs’. This assumption is challenged
Keywords Future contigents  Indeterminacy  Context
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DOI 10.1111/papq.12077
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References found in this work BETA

Future Contingents and Relative Truth.John MacFarlane - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):321–336.
Afterthoughts.David Kaplan - 1989 - In J. Almog, J. Perry & H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 565-614.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Utility of Content-Relativism.Paula Sweeney - 2014 - Dialectica 68 (4):563-579.

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