Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (3):419-428 (2016)

Paula Sweeney
University of Aberdeen
The purpose of this paper is to define the sentence-tokened—a product of utterance distinct from the act of utterance—and highlight the role that it can play in communication. In particular, the author will suggest that this entity is plausibly at the root of John MacFarlane’s motivating intuitions for the view that truth is assessment-sensitive. Here the author argues that the truth-value intuitions that MacFarlane uses to motivate his view can be accommodated within the Kaplanian semantic framework, once we acknowledge the sentence-tokened and the role it can play.
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DOI 10.1163/18756735-09303006
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References found in this work BETA

Relativism and Disagreement.John MacFarlane - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (1):17-31.
Making Sense of Relative Truth.John MacFarlane - 2005 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):321–339.
Future Contingents and Relative Truth.John MacFarlane - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):321–336.
Words.David Kaplan - 1990 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 64 (1):93-119.

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