Philosophy in Review 36 (3):103-108 (2016)

James Swindler
Illinois State University
In The Ant Trap, Brian Epstein proposes a bold new systematic strategy for developing social ontology. He explores the history and current state of the art and provides pointed critiques of leading theories in the field. His framework, incompassing frames that provide principles for grounding social facts, is developed in some detail across a variety of social practices and applied to revealing real world as well as hyporthetical examples. If Epstein's account holds, it should provide new directions and standards of inquiry in both social sciecne and social philiosophy.
Keywords social ontology  social science methodology  social facts
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