In Free Will and Modern Science. Oup/British Academy (2011)
This chapter argues that it is most unlikely that neuroscientists will ever be able to predict human actions resulting from difficult moral decisions with any high degree of probable success. That result leaves open the possibility that humans sometimes decide which actions to perform, without their decisions being predetermined by prior causes. The chapter begins with two assumptions, which provide a different framework within which to work out how far human actions are predictable from that of Frank Jackson, and which lead to a different kind of conclusion.
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