The Philosophical Review 129 (1):1-51 (2020)

Authors
Kurt Sylvan
University of Southampton
Abstract
Despite the recent backlash against epistemic consequentialism, an explicit systematic alternative has yet to emerge. This paper articulates and defends a novel alternative, Epistemic Kantianism, which rests on a requirement of respect for the truth. §1 tackles some preliminaries concerning the proper formulation of the epistemic consequentialism / non-consequentialism divide, explains where Epistemic Kantianism falls in the dialectical landscape, and shows how it can capture what seems attractive about epistemic consequentialism while yielding predictions that are harder for the latter to secure in a principled way. §2 presents Epistemic Kantianism. §3 argues that it is uniquely poised to satisfy the desiderata set out in §1 on an ideal theory of epistemic justification. §4 gives three further arguments, suggesting that it (i) best explains the objective normative significance of the subject's perspective in epistemology, (ii) follows from the kind of axiology needed to solve the swamping problem together with modest assumptions about the relation between the evaluative and the deontic, and (iii) illuminates certain asymmetries in epistemic value and obligation. §5 takes stock and reassesses the score in the debate.
Keywords Epistemic Consequentialism  Epistemic Justification  Epistemic Value  Ethics of Belief  Kantian Ethics
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Reprint years 2020
DOI 10.1215/00318108-7890455
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals.Immanuel Kant - 1785/2002 - Oxford University Press.
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Belief gambles in epistemic decision theory.Mattias Skipper - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):407-426.
Respect and the Reality of Apparent Reasons.Kurt L. Sylvan - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
All Swamping, No Problem.Joseph Bjelde - 2020 - Analysis 80 (2):205-211.
Inquiry and the Epistemic.David Thorstad - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-16.

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