In Nick Hughes (ed.), Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press (forthcoming)

Authors
Errol Lord
University of Pennsylvania
Kurt Sylvan
University of Southampton
Abstract
We argue that we can avoid epistemic dilemmas by properly understanding the nature and epistemology of the suspension of judgment, with a particular focus on conflicts between higher-order evidence and first-order evidence.
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