Emergence and Reflexive Downward

Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 6 (1):183–201 (2002)
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Abstract

This paper responds to Jaegwon Kim's powerful objection to the very possibility of genuinely novel emergent properties Kim argue that the incoherence of reflexive downward causation means that the causal power of an emergent phenomenon is ultimately reducible to the causal powers of its constituents. I offer a a simple argument showing how to characterize emergent properties m terms of the effects of structural relations an the causal powers of that constituents.

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John Symons
University of Kansas

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