Intuition and philosophical methodology

Axiomathes 18 (1):67-89 (2008)
Abstract
Intuition serves a variety of roles in contemporary philosophy. This paper provides a historical discussion of the revival of intuition in the 1970s, untangling some of the ways that intuition has been used and offering some suggestions concerning its proper place in philosophical investigation. Contrary to some interpretations of the results of experimental philosophy, it is argued that generalized skepticism with respect to intuition is unwarranted. Intuition can continue to play an important role as part of a methodologically conservative stance towards philosophical investigation. I argue that methodological conservatism should be sharply distinguished from the process of evaluating individual propositions. Nevertheless, intuition is not always a reliable guide to truth and experimental philosophy can serve a vital ameliorative role in determining the scope and limits of our intuitive competence with respect to various areas of inquiry.
Keywords Intuition  Experimental philosophy  Philosophical methodology
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DOI 10.1007/s10516-007-9019-7
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References found in this work BETA
Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
The Epistemic Value of Intuitive Moral Judgements.Albert W. Musschenga - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):113-128.
Accounting for the Data: Intuitions in Moral Theory Selection.Ben Eggleston - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (4):761-774.

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