Authors
Justin Sytsma
Victoria University of Wellington
Abstract
There is ample evidence that violations of injunctive norms impact ordinary causal attributions. This has struck some as deeply surprising, taking the ordinary concept of causation to be purely descriptive. Our explanation of the findings—the responsibility view—rejects this: we contend that the concept is in fact partly normative, being akin to concepts like responsibility and accountability. Based on this account, we predicted a very different pattern of results for causal attributions when an agent violates a statistical norm. And this pattern has been borne out by the data. These predictions were based on the responsibility attributions that we would make. In this paper, I extend these previous findings, testing responsibility attributions. The results confirm the basis of our predictions, showing the same pattern of effects previously found for causal attributions for both injunctive norms and statistical norms. In fact, the results for responsibility attributions are not statistically significantly different from those previously found for causal attributions. I argue that this close correspondence lends further credence to the responsibility view over competing explanations of the impact of norms on causal attributions.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s13164-020-00498-2
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 59,968
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Cause and Norm.Christopher Hitchcock & Joshua Knobe - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (11):587-612.
Person as Scientist, Person as Moralist.Joshua Knobe - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):315.
Graded Causation and Defaults.Joseph Y. Halpern & Christopher Hitchcock - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (2):413-457.

View all 27 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Two Types of Typicality: Rethinking the Role of Statistical Typicality in Ordinary Causal Attributions.Justin Sytsma, Jonathan Livengood & David Rose - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 43 (4):814-820.
Responsibility Regardless of Causation.Federico Faroldi - 2014 - In Bacchini, Dell'Utri & Caputo (eds.), New Advances in Causation, Agency, and Moral Responsibility. Cambridge Scholars Press.
Causation and Responsibility.Carolina Sartorio - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (5):749–765.
Lying, Uptake, Assertion, and Intent.Angelo Turri & John Turri - 2016 - International Review of Pragmatics 8 (2):314-333.
Causal Proportions and Moral Responsibility.Sara Bernstein - 2017 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Volume 4. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 165-182.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2020-08-02

Total views
14 ( #694,558 of 2,433,342 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
8 ( #84,324 of 2,433,342 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes