Phenomenal consciousness poses a puzzle for philosophy of science. This arises from two facts: It is common for philosophers (and some scientists) to take its existence to be phenomenologically obvious and yet modern science arguably has little (if anything) to say about it. And, this despite 20 years of work targeting the phenomenon in what I will refer to as the new science of consciousness. How has such a supposedly evident part of our world remained beyond our scientific understanding? One possibility is that there is no such phenomenon. This possibility, however, is undercut by the claim that phenomenal consciousness is phenomenologically obvious. In this paper I argue that this claim is mistaken. Distinguishing between the qualities we are phenomenologically aware of and the classification of those qualities as being mental (as qualia), I present both empirical evidence and theoretical reasons to deny that the latter is phenomenologically obvious.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Sidestepping the Semantics of “Consciousness”.Michael V. Antony - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (2):289-290.
Phenomenal Consciousness and What It's Like.David M. Rosenthal - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):156--57.
Binding and the Phenomenal Unity of Consciousness.Antti Revonsuo - 1999 - Consciousness and Cognition 8 (2):173-85.
Adaptive Complexity and Phenomenal Consciousness.Shaun Nichols & Todd A. Grantham - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (4):648-670.
The Ontology of Creature Consciousness: A Challenge for Philosophy.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):103-104.
Consciousness: The Transcendalist Manifesto.Mark Rowlands - 2003 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (3):205-21.
Phenomenological Obviousness and the New Science of Consciousness.Justin Sytsma - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (5):958-969.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads3 ( #691,375 of 2,158,463 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #132,912 of 2,158,463 )
How can I increase my downloads?