Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):241-256 (2019)

Authors
Justin Sytsma
Victoria University of Wellington
Eyuphan Ozdemir
Victoria University of Wellington (PhD)
Abstract
The meta-problem is 'the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness' (Chalmers, 2018, p. 6). This presupposes that we think there is a problem in the first place. We challenge the breadth of this 'we', arguing that there is already sufficient empirical evidence to cast doubt on the claim. We then add to this body of evidence, presenting the results of a new cross-cultural study extending the work of Sytsma and Machery (2010).
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Is the Hard Problem of Consciousness Universal?David Chalmers - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):227-257.
Zombie Intuitions.Eugen Fischer & Justin Sytsma - forthcoming - Cognition.

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