On the relevance of folk intuitions: A commentary on Talbot

Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):654-660 (2012)

Authors
Edouard Machery
University of Pittsburgh
Justin Sytsma
Victoria University of Wellington
Abstract
In previous work, we presented evidence suggesting that ordinary people do not conceive of subjective experiences as having phenomenal qualities. We then argued that these findings undermine a common justification given for the reality of the hard problem of consciousness. In a thought-provoking article, Talbot has challenged our argument. In this article, we respond to his criticism
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1016/j.concog.2011.04.003
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 41,650
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Two Conceptions of Subjective Experience.Justin Sytsma & Edouard Machery - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (2):299-327.

View all 6 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Experimental Philosophy of Pain.Justin Sytsma & Kevin Reuter - 2017 - Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 34 (3):611-628.
Unfelt Pain.Kevin Reuter & Justin Sytsma - forthcoming - Synthese.
The Curious Case of the Decapitated Frog: On Experiment and Philosophy.Alexander Klein - 2018 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (5):890-917.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Folk Concepts and Intuitions: From Philosophy to Cognitive Science.Shaun Nichols - 2004 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (11):514-518.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2013-12-18

Total views
35 ( #232,661 of 2,250,031 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #605,613 of 2,250,031 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature