On the Relevance of Folk Intuitions: A Reply to Talbot


Authors
Edouard Machery
University of Pittsburgh
Justin Sytsma
Victoria University of Wellington
Abstract
In previous work, we presented evidence suggesting that ordinary people do not conceive of subjective experiences as having phenomenal qualities. We then argued that these findings undermine a common justification given for the reality of the hard problem of consciousness. In a thought-provoking article, Talbot has challenged our argument. In this article, we respond to his criticism.
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References found in this work BETA

Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making.Shane Frederick - 2005 - Journal of Economic Perspectives 19 (4):25-42.

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Revisiting the Valence Account.Justin Sytsma - 2012 - Philosophical Topics 40 (2):179-198.

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