Two conceptions of subjective experience

Philosophical Studies 151 (2):299-327 (2010)
Abstract
Do philosophers and ordinary people conceive of subjective experience in the same way? In this article, we argue that they do not and that the philosophical concept of phenomenal consciousness does not coincide with the folk conception. We first offer experimental support for the hypothesis that philosophers and ordinary people conceive of subjective experience in markedly different ways. We then explore experimentally the folk conception, proposing that for the folk, subjective experience is closely linked to valence. We conclude by considering the implications of our findings for a central issue in the philosophy of mind, the hard problem of consciousness.
Keywords Phenomenal consciousness  Folk concept of subjective experience  Experimental philosophy  Hard problem of consciousness
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-009-9439-x
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 25,662
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness.David J. Chalmers - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.
Kinds of Minds.Daniel C. Dennett - 1996 - Basic Books.

View all 22 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Intuition Fail: Philosophical Activity and the Limits of Expertise.Wesley Buckwalter - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):378-410.

View all 28 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-09-14

Total downloads

225 ( #15,300 of 2,143,796 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

47 ( #5,022 of 2,143,796 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums