Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (3):303-324 (2012)
There are two primary traditions in philosophical theorizing about moral standing—one emphasizing Experience (the capacity to feel pain and pleasure) and one emphasizing Agency (complexity of cognition and lifestyle). In this article we offer an explanation for this divide: Lay judgments about moral standing depend importantly on two independent cues (Experience and Agency), and the two philosophical traditions reflect this aspect of folk moral cognition. In support of this two-source hypothesis, we present the results of a series of new experiments providing evidence for our account of lay judgments about moral standing, and argue that these results lend plausibility to the proposed causal link between folk moral cognition and the philosophical traditions.
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References found in this work BETA
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.Immanuel Kant - 2007 - In Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe, Richard McCarty, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Late Modern Philosophy: Essential Readings with Commentary. Blackwell.
Intuitions About Consciousness: Experimental Studies.Joshua Knobe & Jesse J. Prinz - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):67-83.
Two Conceptions of Subjective Experience.Justin Sytsma & Edouard Machery - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (2):299-327.
Citations of this work BETA
Cruel Nature: Harmfulness as an Important, Overlooked Dimension in Judgments of Moral Standing.Jared Piazza, Justin F. Landy & Geoffrey P. Goodwin - 2014 - Cognition 131 (1):108-124.
The Phenomenal Stance Revisited.Anthony I. Jack & Philip Robbins - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (3):383-403.
Empirical Methods in Animal Ethics.Kirsten Persson & David Shaw - 2015 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 28 (5):853-866.
Experimental Approaches to Moral Standing.Geoffrey P. Goodwin - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):914-926.
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