Believing in things

Abstract
I argue against the standard view that ontological debates can be fully described as disagreements about what we should believe to exist. The central thesis of the paper is that believing in Fs in the ontologically relevant sense requires more than merely believing that Fs exist. Believing in Fs is not even a propositional attitude; it is rather an attitude one bears to the term expressed by 'Fs'. The representational correctness of such a belief requires not only that there be Fs, but also that the term expressed by 'Fs' should not misrepresent them. In certain cases we might believe that there are Fs without believing our conception of Fs applies to them. This may well be the situation we are in with regard to abstract entities of various sorts
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00280.x
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 32,688
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume - 1738 - Oxford University Press.
Truth.Paul Horwich - 1998 - Clarendon Press.
Material Beings.Peter van Inwagen - 1990 - Cornell University Press.
Truth.Paul Horwich - 1999 - In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), Erkenntnis. Oxford University Press. pp. 261-272.
Realism in Mathematics.Penelope Maddy - 1990 - Oxford University Prress.

View all 24 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Experiencing the Present.Uriah Kriegel - 2015 - Analysis 75 (3):407-413.
Attitudes Towards Objects.Alex Grzankowski - 2016 - Noûs 50 (2):314-328.
Against Propositionalism.Michelle Montague - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):503–518.
Not All Attitudes Are Propositional.Alex Grzankowski - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy (3):374-391.
Ontological Commitment.Agustín Rayo - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (3):428–444.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Tempered Expressivism.Mark Schroeder - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics.
Is Seeing Believing?Russell B. Goodman - 1974 - Proceedings of the New Mexico-West Texas Philosophical Society 40 (April):45.
Believing Badly.Damian Cox & Michael Levine - 2004 - Philosophical Papers 33 (3):309-328.
The Basic Notion of Justification.Jonathan L. Kvanvig & Christopher Menzel - 1990 - Philosophical Studies 59 (3):235-261.
Evidentialism and Pragmatic Constraints on Outright Belief.Dorit Ganson - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (3):441 - 458.
In Defence of Believing Wishfully.Mark Mercer - 2010 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 24 (2):211-224.
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
132 ( #42,622 of 2,237,247 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #95,780 of 2,237,247 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature