Human Studies 38 (4):503-527 (2015)

Authors
Thomas Szanto
University of Copenhagen
Abstract
Recently, an increasing body of work from sociology, social psychology, and social ontology has been devoted to collective emotions. Rather curiously, however, pressing epistemological and especially normative issues have received almost no attention. In particular, there has been a strange silence on whether one can share emotions with individuals or groups who are not aware of such sharing, or how one may identify this, and eventually identify specific norms of emotional sharing. In this paper, I shall address this set of issues head-on. I will do so by drawing on one of the most elaborate, but rather neglected phenomenological accounts of sociality, namely Edith Stein’s work on communal experiences and her theory of empathy. I wish to show that a suitably amended Steinian account affords us with an intriguing alternative to both phenomenalist and normativist construals of collective emotions. Moreover, I shall argue that it provides a more fine-grained account of the different types of emotional sharing than standard accounts, ranging from face-to-face, or shared, to more robust but less direct, or collective, emotions. Finally, I will propose a tentative answer to the above questions by pointing to non-dyadic or collective forms of empathy
Keywords Collective emotions  Empathy  Edith Stein  Phenomenology  Social cognition  Social ontology
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s10746-015-9350-8
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 63,295
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Emotions.Nico H. Frijda - 1986 - Cambridge University Press.
Empathy and Direct Social Perception: A Phenomenological Proposal. [REVIEW]Dan Zahavi - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):541-558.

View all 38 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Extended Emotions.Joel Krueger & Thomas Szanto - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (12):863-878.
In hate we trust: The collectivization and habitualization of hatred.Thomas Szanto - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-28.
In Hate We Trust: The Collectivization and Habitualization of Hatred.Thomas Szanto - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (3):453-480.

View all 19 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Phenomenology of Empathy: A Steinian Emotional Account.Fredrik Svenaeus - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (2):227-245.
Normativity and Interpersonal Reasons.Ken O'Day - 1998 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):61-87.
From Normativity to Responsibility.Joseph Raz - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Similarity Versus Familiarity: When Empathy Becomes Selfish.Elias L. Khalil - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):41-41.
Direct Perception and Simulation: Stein’s Account of Empathy.Monika Dullstein - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2):333-350.
Rejecting Empathy for Animal Ethics.T. J. Kasperbauer - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (4):817-833.
Against Empathy.Jesse Prinz - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):214-233.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2015-09-05

Total views
99 ( #108,609 of 2,448,723 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #178,875 of 2,448,723 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes