Fictionalism and Moore's paradox

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):293-307 (2001)
A fictionalist attitude towards an area of discourse encourages us to assent to certain sentences of that discourse without believing that they are true. Prima facie, this amounts to a suggestion that we should also assent to sentences of the form 'S but I don't believe that S'. Traditional versions of fictionalism have an answer to this challenge, but I argue that the answer is unavailable for a currently popular type of fictionalism. This is bad news for fictionalism in general because the currently popular variety is the one that deals best with the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
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ISBN(s) 0045-5091
DOI 10.1080/00455091.2001.10717569
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A Reply to My Critics.George Edward Moore - 1942 - In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of G. E. Moore. Open Court.
On What There's Not.Joseph Melia - 1995 - Analysis 55 (4):223 - 229.

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Pejorative Discourse is Not Fictional.Teresa Marques - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy:1-14.

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